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Abstract: Behavioural biometrics have the potential to provide an additional or alternative authentication mechanism to those
involving a shared secret (i.e., a password). Keystroke timings are the focus of this study, where key press and release timings are
acquired whilst monitoring a user typing a known phrase. Many studies exist in keystroke biometrics, but there is an absence of
literature aiming to understand the relationship between characteristics of password policies and the potential of keystroke biomet-
rics. Furthermore, benchmark data sets used in keystroke biometric research do not enable useful insights into the relationship
between their capability and password policy. In this work, we consider substitutions of uppercase, numeric, special characters,
and their combination on passwords derived from English words. We acquire timings for 42 participants for the same 40 pass-
words. We implement a matching system using the Manhattan distance measure with seven different feature sets, culminating
in an Equal Error Rate of between 6-11% and accuracy values between 89-94%, demonstrating comparable accuracy to other
threshold-based systems. Further analysis suggests that the best feature sets are those containing all timings and trigraph press
to press. Evidence also suggests that phrases containing fewer characters have greater accuracy, except for those with special
character substitutions.
1 Introduction
The use of digital resources throughout modern society has man-
dated the need to adequately restrict access to authorised users.
Restricting access requires a robust and reliable means of perform-
ing user authentication. In most restriction mechanisms, a user will
state an identity and then provide information that can verify that
they have indeed claimed their correct identity. The most common
implementation is a password system, where the password is kept
secret and used to authenticate a user. Although password-based sys-
tems provide a good first-line defence, their is a continuing struggle
between the complexity of the password to implement strong secu-
rity and the user’s desire for ease-of-access. To withstand brute-force
attacks, a strong password policy is often enforced involving a com-
bination of lower and upper case, numeric, and special characters
that should be frequently changed [1]. However, passwords gen-
erated to this specification become hard to remember, resulting in
the user finding ways to increase memorability, which includes per-
forming systematic variation (i.e., increasing a number at the end)
or simply writing the password down so that it does not need to be
remembered. It is widely acknowledged that there is a trade-off to be
achieved between memorability and security, and it is challenging
to create a policy to guide the user to good practice without being
overly restrictive and making it difficult to remember [2, 3]. Evi-
dence suggests that there is good and increasing use of passwords
using substitutions [4].
The challenges of password-based authentication systems have
inevitably resulted in the exploration of approaches that have strong
security properties whilst reducing the burden of remembering on the
user. Biometric systems provide an alternative approach to authenti-
cation whereby physiological, behavioural and chemical character-
istics are sensed and used to authenticate a user in replacement (or in
addition) to a password. Biometric systems have always been heav-
ily researched and there is a wealth of literature on the different types
and their applications, as presented by these extensive surveys [5, 6].
For example, in terms of physiological, fingerprints and facial fea-
tures are examples. In terms of behavioural, voice and keystroke
dynamics are two examples. For chemical biometrics, DNA and
odour are two examples. Recent advancements also include using
behavioural biometrics extracted from wearable fitness trackers [7],
and also using it for clinical purposes, such as stress detection [8].
Biometric systems impact on their users in different ways, depending
on whether they are invasive or passive for the participant. For exam-
ple, facial recognition is passive as it can be captured from video or
image of the user without them taking special action, whereas a fin-
gerprint system is invasive as the user needs to physically connect
with a sensing device.
In this paper we revisit the topic of keystroke biometrics for
authentication. Keystroke timings can be acquired passively from
the user whilst they type their password. The use case is that the
keystroke information is acquired as the user enters their password,
thus providing a two-factor approach and helping to prevent against
their account being compromised by a brute-force attack or being
used should their password be acquired by an adversary. This is a
well-established biometric area and its first use can be traced back
to analysts in World War II aiming to track operators sending Morse
Code messages via radio communication [9]. There have since been
many studies on keystroke biometrics, focusing on the extraction
of different features, using different phrase lengths, and different
learning algorithms [10–12].
Although, many papers do exist providing useful insight, there is
a lack of empirical analysis investigating how keystroke biometric
systems could be affected by different password policy character-
istics (uppercase, numeric, special character, and length) that are
often introduced to increased password security. The majority of key
works in this area use data sets acquired from typing either the same
phrase or from monitoring all user typing input, consisting of free-
text input and not single password phrases. Furthermore, the phrases
extracted in these data sets would not meet the majority of password
policies, where a uppercase, numeric, or special symbol substitu-
tion are required. As we are investigating the use case of keystroke
biometric authentication as an additional authentication layer on the
user’s password, it is necessary to gain timings from phrases contain-
ing characteristics that are aligned with common password policies.
There is a need to understand how keystroke systems perform based
on different password characteristics, to ensure that a balance can
be achieved whereby the combined use of password and keystroke
provide security beyond that of each single component.
To investigate the relationship between password policy char-
acteristic and keystroke biometrics, an empirical study has been
performed, involving acquiring timings from 42 participants, before
systematically analysing using a distance measure and threshold
approach. The following are the main contributions provided in this
work:
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• The design of a rigorous keystroke biometric data collection
exercise with varying password policy characteristics (length and
character substitution), resulting in a publicly available data set
containing found sets timings for 42 individuals for 40 passwords.
• Equal Error Rates are achieved between 6-11% with accuracy
between 89-94% for all feature sets. Empirical observations reveal
the impact of the number of characters and types of character
substitutions, providing new knowledge on their relationship.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows: In Section 2
related work is presented and discussed. Section 3 details the con-
sidered features and the methodology followed in this research.
Section 4 discusses acquired data and details enrolment template
creation. Section 5 details the matching mechanism used in this
research followed by the process for empirical testing. Section 6
details the results and considers the impact of different password pol-
icy components, and finally, a conclusion and area for future work
are provided.
2 Related Work
Behavioural biometrics are considered as a security strengthening
addition to the existing authentication schemes. The domain of
behavioural biometrics is an active research discipline and is contin-
uously evolving in capability. For example, a recent study proposed
a new smartphone authentication system, called AnswerAuth, which
is based on the way a user unlocks their phone and brings it towards
their ear [13]. The evaluation was performed on a data set of 85
users, containing 10,200 patterns, and achieved 98.98% accuracy
using a Random Forrest classifier. Another recent work investigated
the feasibility of using gaze-based behavioural indices to perform
user classification [14]. The developed solution was tested on 9 par-
ticipants and obtained 97% accuracy. Many research studies also
propose the fusion of multiple behavioural biometrics (i.e. Multi-
modal techniques) to gain better performance, such as integrating
eye movement and mouse dynamics achieved 92.9% accuracy for a
short subject registration time of 20 seconds [15].
Previous behavioural biometric studies are predominantly pub-
licly available data sets, which contain a large number of samples
(repetitions) for a large number of users. In keystroke biometrics,
these datasets are often acquired from monitoring users typing free
text input. For example, the Aalto University Dataset containing key
timings for 168k participants over a three-month time period [16].
In collecting the data, users type 15 sentences from a large sen-
tence pool. The sentences are in English and are not provided as
a single phrase, such as a password. Furthermore, the data has no
substitutions. Therefore, there is an absence of data sets where the
participants are typing phrases with different types of character sub-
stitutions in a controlled manner. This is because the large data sets
have often been acquired passively through key logging from will-
ing participants when typing phrases longer than passwords. The
lack of a suitable data set could be a motivating reason as to why
the relationship between password policy and keystroke capabilities
has received less attention. The research presented in this paper is
positioned to provide knowledge on this important topic.
In terms of the development and progression of keydynamic bio-
metric systems, one of the earliest studies was performed on 50
subjects, where each subject chose their own password of 6-15
characters in length [17]. In the study, the researchers achieved
91% accuracy through the use of Multi-layer Perceptron (MLP)
and Probabilistic Neural Network (PNN) algorithms. The achieve-
ment of this study is significant as it used representative password
phrases. Subsequent studies were able to improve in terms of accu-
racy. For example, one study [18] also applied MLPs on 20,400
data samples using 34 features and achieved an Equal Error Rate
(eer) of 4.45%. The data set was acquired from 51 subjects by typ-
ing .tie5Roanl as the password, which contains a special character,
upper and lowercase characters as well as a number. Although these
results are promising, the single phrase password, not closely repre-
senting a word, does not provide an insight into how the err might
change should the password change in terms of length and sub-
stitution. Another research work developed a new, highly scalable
keystroke-based biometric system called, TypeNet [19]. The Type-
Net performs user authentication using Siamese Recurrent Neural
Network (RNN). The evaluation of TypeNet was performed on one
of the largest keystorke dataset, containing 136 million keystrokes
from 168,000 users, and achieved 9.53%-3.33% Equal Error Rate
(eer).
Other studies have continued to build upon earlier success, using
the same data set. For example, another study [20] used a com-
bination of Support Vector Machine (SVM) and Deep Learning
algorithms to train keystrokes (key press/release events) from the
.tie5Roanl password. The data was acquired from 51 subjects, where
each subject performed 400 repetitions of a password. The solution
demonstrated an accuracy of 92.60%. Another paper used SVMs to
identify users based on keystroke biometrics [21]. A set of 155 fea-
tures were extracted from the .tie5Roanl password using different
combinations of timings. Using a data set gathered from 94 subjects,
the developed solution demonstrated over 97% accuracy.
Research have also been undertaken using different data sets. In
one work, the authors collected 4,126 data samples from 22 sub-
jects when typing the numeric password of 766420 [22]. In another
study [23], a database of 7,600 sequences was acquired over the
duration of four months from 300 users. The sequences are users’
first name and surname typed together. The features used in this
study are hold time, release-press latency and press-press latency.
A total of 31 machine learning algorithms were used for evaluation.
The solution has achieved err as low as 5.32%. A different study [24]
used .tie5Roalnb, .aeihoz246@, .nzkla29zah.# and aeR5t.ilnb pass-
words to acquire 30,000 samples from 1,000 voluntary subjects. The
data set was used to train several classifiers, demonstrating accuracy
of> 98% and an ability to manage large data sets. This study shows
that the characteristics of passwords (e.g., length, types of letters,
entropy, etc.) impact on the feature extraction process, and conse-
quently the accuracy and performance of the overall authentication
system. Another study introduced the use of a Partially Observ-
able Hidden Markov Model (POHMM) [25]. The authors employed
5 publicly-available keystroke data sets to evaluate the POHMM.
The POHMM consistently achieved higher performance and better
accuracy over existing solutions in terms of user identification and
(continuous) verification.
Keystroke authentication systems have also been developed for
mobile devices. One such work used the .tie5Roanl password to
acquire a keystroke data set from 42 subjects [26]. Each subject
typed the same password for 60 times on an Android device. Fol-
lowing this, keystroke dynamics were used to extract 71 made up
from different timing combinations. After testing multiple algo-
rithms, it was concluded that the Random Forest obtained the highest
accuracy of 82.53%. A recent paper proposed the consolidation of
2-graph and 3-graph time-based features and achieved 4.19% false
acceptance rate and 4.59% false positive rate [27]. The keystroke
data was acquired from 152 subjects using a digit-only password,
containing 17 characters. The password was typed on mobile touch-
screen 10 times by each subject. A different study built a solution to
handle typing errors whilst entering passwords [28]. This included
collecting timings from 10 subjects making intentional mistakes
while typing the password of [Mohammed-63] on a mobile device.
As compared to random forest classifier that showed 12% err, the
proposed solution presented 9% err and is based on time-based
keystroke features.
A recent study [29] proposed the fusion of keystroke dynamics
with gait patterns to perform continuous user authentication on the
mobile devices. The data acquisition occurs while the user walks and
inputs text, simultaneously. Based on an evaluation data set collected
from 20 participants, the developed solution achieved 99.11% accu-
racy using the multilayer perceptron classifier. Similarly, another
study [30] demonstrates that using touch dynamics in addition to
PIN-based authentication system significantly increases the level of
security. In case of PIN number being fully compromised, the prob-
ability of a successful impersonation attempt is reduced from 100%
to only 9.9%.
pp. 1–12
2
t∨1 t∧1 t∨2 t∧2 t∨3 t∧3 t∨4 t∧4 t∨5 t∧5 t∨6 t∧6
p-r
p-p
r-p
r-r
trigraph p-p
trigraph r-r
a c t i o n
Fig. 1: key down (t∨) and key release (t∧) timestamps acquired from a participant whilst typing action, as well as demonstrating different
features.
There are many other applications that have used similarity mea-
sures as a pose to machine learning techniques. This works by
scoring a new sample against an enrolled template to determine if
it is a positive match, within a predefined threshold [31]. Similarity
measures include examples such as Gaussian mixture model-based
matching [32] and distance measuring [31]. These techniques also
demonstrate 90% accuracy, but there is the added challenge of
determining decision boundaries. However, although their accuracy
might be slightly lower than machine learning approaches, they
have advantages in terms of research as they require no training
phrase, resulting in them requiring less computation overheads. Fur-
thermore, from a research perspective, using a similarity measure
approach can help with understanding any relationships in the under-
lying data sets that could be hidden by the generalised approach of
machine learning mechanisms.
The absence of any research and available data set to in the area
of understanding characteristics of password policies and keystroke
dynamic systems motivates the design and collection of a suitable
data set. Furthermore, it is evident that a vast range of matching
mechanisms can be used in keystroke dynamic systems with varying
accuracy, but more traditional distance measuring approaches can
still achieve good accuracy, which is significant considering their
ease-of-use and transparent inner-workings.
3 Method
In order to gain a comprehensive understanding of how password
policy affects the performance of keystroke biometric systems, we
have performed the following process:
• Established a set of 40 passwords of varying length constructed
from English dictionary words. Substitutions of different types are
then made to some of the passwords. These variations are uppercase,
numeric, special symbol, and combination of all three;
• Collect timings for all 40 passwords for 42 participants. Each
participant will type each password 4 times;
• Implement a distance-based scoring technique and threshold
approach to compare test data sets with enrolled templates;
• Use three of a participant’s timings to process into an enrolled
sample. The fourth sample is reserved for testing purposes, where
each participant’s test sample is compared against all enrolled tem-
plates to see whether it matches the correct participant or not. The
experiment is repeated with multiple threshold values; and finally
• We analyse the results to identify accuracy characteristics of the
system in regard to the different password characteristics and feature
sets.
The remainder of this section provides more detail on the above
outlined process.
3.1 Passwords
The passwords are all generated by selecting English dictionary
words of varying complexity using the following criteria, which is
guided by a survey into user practice in passwords [4]. In the study
of 6 million passwords, 75% were between 8 and 10 characters
in length. Furthermore, in excess of 40% are either native English
words either in their unchanged form or with substitution. However,
this study uses passwords generated from a system in Asia (acquired
from the Chinese Software Developer Network) and therefore has
a high portion (67%) of non-native English speakers. Other stud-
ies focusing on systems with a higher portion of English-speaking
users report percentages [33]. In the study with 6 million passwords,
12.4% are alphabet only, 39% include at least one number, and 3.2%
include the use of a symbol. Note that the password policy of the
Chinese Software Developer Network did not require the use of a
symbol. For these reasons, and in the interest of developing a rep-
resentative password set, the following specification is followed to
generate passwords. In total, 40 passwords of varying complexity
are used to acquire timings from the user.
• Varying character length of 6, 8, 10, 12. There will be two words
for each character length;
• Two more English words for each length will be selected and one
uppercase letter substitution will be performed in each word;
• Two more English words for each length will be selected and one
numeric letter substitution will be performed in each word;
• Two more English words for each length will be selected and one
special character substitution will be performed in each word; and
• Two more English words for each length will be selected and one
uppercase, one numeric, and one special character substitution will
be performed in each word.
The full combination of passwords is included in Appendix 9.1.
As seen in the list of passwords, uppercase substitutions are used at
different locations, whereas numeric and special character substitu-
tions are used to replace characters where the shape of the number or
special character is sufficient to act as a substitution for the normal
letter. The specific special characters used in this experiment are: !,
£, |, $, \, #, and @. Each participant will be asked for the password
a total of four times. The entire list will circulate three times in the
same order, and finally, in the fourth iteration the ordering of the
passwords will be randomised to the same order for all participants.
3.2 Acquired Timings
A software tool has been developed in C# to (1) present the pass-
word to the user, (2) acquire and record timestamps as they type the
password, and (3) perform validation to ensure the user types the
phrase correctly, and if not, ask them to repeat it. However, as the
participants will perform their experiment unsupervised, there is the
possibility that they can exit the software and not complete the exer-
cise. The software tool records millisecond timings for the key down
and key up actions as the password is displayed to the participant,
until they select a ‘next’ button or press the carriage return key to
inform the software they have finished. Figure 1 displays a graph-
ical illustration of the individual key down and key up timestamps
whilst the participant is typing the action password. There are in
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total twelve timestamps recorded from the participant typing the six-
letter word. Each character will generate a timestamp when a key is
pressed (t∨1) and one when the key is released (t∧1).
3.3 Features
The below list provides a description of each of the different features
and Figure 1 provides an illustration:
• Full Timings (f-t): the duration between each key action in sequen-
tial order, regardless of whether it is an up or down action (same as
merging both p-r and r-p).
• Press to Release (p-r): the duration between the time a key is
pressed and released, which in Figure 1 is t∧1 − t∨1. Other studies
refer to this as the hold or dwell time.
• Press to Press (p-p): the duration between the time a key is pressed
and the next key in the password is pressed. In the example presented
in Figure 1, this feature is calculated by t∨2 − t∨1. Other studies
also refer to this feature as a diagraph press time.
• Release to Press (r-p): the duration between a key being released
and the next one being pressed. In Figure 1 this feature is calculated
by t∨2 − t∧1. In some studies, this feature is referred to as a dwell,
release, or seek time.
• Release to Release (r-r): the duration between the release of a key
and the release of the next key in the password phrase. In the example
presented in Figure 1, this is calculated by t∧2 − t∧1. Other studies
also refer to this feature as a diagraph release time.
• Trigraph press to press (trigraph p-p): the duration between the
time a key is pressed and the second next key in the password
is pressed. In the example presented in Figure 1, this feature is
calculated by t∨6 − t∨4.
• Trigraph release to release (trigraph r-r): the duration between the
release of a key and the release of second the next key in the pass-
word phrase. In the example presented in Figure 1, this is calculated
by t∧6 − t∧4.
4 Data Analysis
In this section, and before considering the utility of the acquired data
and the different features as demonstrated in Section 3.3, it is neces-
sary to analyse a participant’s four responses for each password, as
detailed in Section 3. In total, 42 participants took part in the data
collection exercise. All participants are undergraduate students on
a Computing related degree and therefore have strong typing profi-
ciency. In terms of completeness, the majority of the participants did
provide a full series of samples; however, upon analysis it is evident
that in some instances recordings are missing due to the user stop-
ping and restarting the test. Due to incompleteness of only having
one completed sample per password, some data sets are incomplete.
In total 87% of all password and participant combinations have four
samples. For example, participant 24 is missing responses (password
20, 23, 30, and 31). There are also many other instances where a user
has provided two or three samples per password. This has occurred
when a user exits the data collection exercise. However, as the work
in this paper presents an empirical analysis, the data is still used
during the analysis as it can be used to gain an understanding of
the technique’s capabilities. There is also one instance (participant
34) where more samples have been provided than necessary. This is
because the user has restarted the data collection exercise, resulting
in too many timings being acquired.
Table 4 provides the number of times a participant provided
repeated data sets for each password. Any number in the ’0’ row
means that there are instances where they submitted no response at
all. The table counts up to 6 repetitions, which was the maximum
acquired. As evident in the table, there are participants who provided
only one series of timings for each password. These are participant
17, 21, 22, 23, 28, 37. The vast majority of participants provide the
required 4 timings. Similarly, table 5 provides the number of repe-
titions for each password, per participant. For most passwords, it is
evident that 30 or more users provide 4 or more samples. However,
this is not the case for passwords 6 11, 14, 15 where 28-29 users pro-
vide 4 or more samples. Interestingly, these passwords have either no
substitution or a single uppercase character. Another interesting find-
ing from the table is that there are not more users providing a lower
number of samples for passwords including all substitution types.
This could suggest that the participant is taking more time and care
with the difficult task.
To demonstrate variation in a user’s timings, Figure 2a provides
the timings for participant number 2 when typing the phrase action.
The up and down timings for each key are displayed relative to
the previous timestamp (tt∨n − tt∧n+1). There are some important
observations that can be established from looking at this example.
Attempt number three has a delay between tt∧ and to∨, which
is not typical when considering the other three samples. Similarly,
the difference between tc∧ and tt∨ is higher than with the other
three samples. Both these timings are release to press (r-p) timings
(seek timings) and would be ignored if this feature was not utilised.
Furthermore, intuitively the forth sample is the quickest sample,
demonstrating that the participant is more familiar with the phrase.
4.1 Template Creation
As illustrated in Figure 2a, although there is good repetition in the
samples provided by participant 2 when typing action, there is an
obvious outlier for i∨ that is significantly different from other i∨
values. As biometric systems are aiming to establish a representative
data set to enrol a user, it is necessary to remove this outlier. In this
example, we consider that of ti∨ demonstrated in Figure 2a as it con-
tains an outlier. We use them-score measure, which is a variation on
the well-known z-score, and is used as a means to identify outliers.
The reason behind using the m-score is its suitability for small sam-
ple sizes, which is pertinent considering in most instances there are
four attempts at each password by each participant [34, 35].
The median is calculated for each password character up and
down action, which for example is X¯ti∨ . We then calculate
the Median Absolute Deviation (MAD) for each character action
MADti∨ . We then calculate an M -score for each t
i
i∨ by the
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(a) Acquired samples
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(b) Outliers removed
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(c) Enrolled template
Fig. 2: Four timings for Participant 2 when typing action
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M ii∨ = 0.6745
ti∨ − X¯ti∨
MADti∨
. (1)
The Median Absolute Deviation (MAD) will converge to the
median of half the normal distribution, which is the 75% percentile
of a normal distribution, and hence the value of 0.6745. For further
information on equation for calculating the MAD, the readers are
directed to early work by Iglewicz and Hoaglin [36].
We then replace ti∨ with X¯ti∨ if the calculatedM ii∨ value is greater
than 3.5. Figure 2b shows an updated series of attempt timings for
participant 2 when typing action. It is evident that the ti∨ outlier
has been removed. It is however noticeable that there is still a large
degree of variation in tn∧. This is to be expected as there is a large
degree of variation amongst all attempts, with no majority being
closely aligned.
As with all biometric systems, a template is created and stored
for future matching. In this approach, the mean of the first three
samples (outliers removed) is used. The purpose for only using the
first three is to keep the fourth sample ‘unseen’ for empirical test-
ing (Section 5). In some instances the participants did not supply
four timings per password. Full information on the number of times
a participant provided repetitions for each password can be seen in
Table 4 and Table 5. Where a user has provided less than the four
samples and providing the total number of provided samples for the
password is greater than or equal to 2, the last sample is reserved
for testing used during template generation. If only one sample has
been provided, the same is used to create a template and test set. The
mean of each up and down key timing is calculated by:
µti∨ =
1
j
j∑
n=1
tni∨, (2)
where j is the number of ti∨ samples. Furthermore, tni∨ is the indi-
vidual key down timings for the character ‘i’. In the example, we
have t1i∨, t
2
i∨, and t
3
i∨. Figure 2c demonstrates the template for the
continuing timing set of participant 2 typing action. Furthermore
the figure also includes templates for the first five participants to
illustrate their difference.
5 Experiment
In this section, an experiment is conducted to determine how effec-
tively key timing information can be used as a biometric. This
specifically involves investigating:
• An approach to match and score a set of timings (test set) against
a template set and determine whether or not it is a match;
• Accuracy information when using the fourth samples of each
participant to match against all enrolled templates;
• The impact on performance of using the seven different feature
sets, as discussed in Section 3.3.
5.1 Matching
In this work, the Manhattan distance measure is used to score how
well a testing sample matches that of an enrolled template [37] func-
tion is used. A distance measure and threshold approach has been
adopted as previous research findings detail that both these mech-
anisms are part of systems that are capable of generating results
comparable with applying general learning mechanisms (e.g., deep
learning) [10, 11, 38]. Although general learning techniques have
good potential, they often do not perform well on smaller data
sets, are open to adversarial attacks [39], their results can be dif-
ficult to interpret [40], and they are computationally expensive to
use. In this exploratory work, the aim is to gain an understanding
of the relationship between password characteristics and accuracy.
This understanding could be easily lost when applying a general
learning mechanism and therefore in this work we adopt a system-
atic and easy to interpret approach. The Manhattan measure is used
over other available distance measures (e.g., Euclidean) as it has
demonstrated to be more suitable to data with a higher number of
dimensions [41]. This is calculated by:
dk,l =
n∑
i=1
|ti − ei| (3)
The testing set is denoted as T = t1, t2, ..., tn and the enrolled
sample as E = e1, e2, ..., en where both ti and ei are individual
timings. n is the size of both test and enrolled set. The Manhattan
distance is measured for each testing set against all participant sam-
ples and recorded in dk,l, where k is the participant number and l is
the password template being used for comparison.
A decision function is established to determine whether the dk,l
value for a specific participant and password is sufficient to deter-
mine a valid match. In this research, we use a threshold, t, which
is used as a decision function. If the dk,l < t then the test sample
matches the specific template, otherwise a non-match is returned.
However, determining the correct threshold value is not trivial as
it will vary between password and feature set. For example, in
Figure 3 dk,l scores can be seen when measuring the test set acquired
from participant 1 for action against each enrolled participant’s tem-
plate for action. Furthermore, measurements for templates generated
using each feature set are included. It is expected that d1,1 (1 on
x-axis) is to be the lowest as that is the correct match; however,
as evident from the figure, there are instances where dk,l scores
within other, incorrect passwords of similar low scores. It is there-
fore clear that determining an effective threshold is challenging and
will inevitably result in false rejections and false acceptances. In
the remainder of this section, empirical analysis is performed for
all seven feature sets with a changing threshold value (t).
5.2 Process
In this empirical analysis, templates are generated for each par-
ticipant and password combination as detailed in Section 4.1. As
previously described, the last of the user’s samples is removed and
stored for testing. This results in the creation of an enrolled set, E,
and a test set, T . In the majority of instances this results in three
samples being used to create an individual participant and password
template, e, and one sample being used as the test set, t. During
testing, each test set will be compared against each enrolled tem-
plate to determine if it is a suitable match. In our data sets, we have
1,492 enrolled samples and 1,670 test sets (generated from 4,324
individual samples), which is approximately a 1/3 enrolled/testing
split. The reason that the number of enrolled samples is smaller than
the number of test sets is due to the fact that in some instances the
participants did not supply four timings per password, as previously
discussed in Section 4.1. As we are comparing each test set to each
enrolment set, the experiment involves a total of 6,229,100 authenti-
cation decisions. In this analysis, the decision threshold, t, starts at 0
and is incremented by 0.1 until 100, where no further changes in per-
formance was identified across all feature sets. This involves running
the experiment on each future set a total of 1000 times. Furthermore,
as we are performing this experiment to consider 7 different features
sets, almost 7 trillion authentication decisions need to be made when
performing the entire experiment. This takes around 2 hours to com-
plete on a computer with an 3.6 GHz i7 CPU with 16GB of available
RAM.
5.3 Evaluation Metrics
In this experiment, we are systematically comparing each test sample
with all enrolled templates. Is is therefore possible to establish the
following measures:
• True Positive Rate (tpr): number of instances where a valid correct
template is matched to the correct test set;
• False Positive Rate (fpr = 1 - tnr): the number of instances where
an incorrect valid template match has been identified using the test
set. This is also known as the False Acceptance Rate (far);
1–12
Feature set Threshold tpr tnr fpr (far) fnr (frr) accuracy
Full Timings 52.9 89.33 89.66 10.33 10.66 89.66
Press to Press 28.1 88.99 89.32 10.67 11.00 89.32
Press to Release 33.8 86.91 87.27 12.72 13.08 87.27
Release to Press 24.6 87.79 88.02 11.97 12.20 88.02
Release to Release 38 87.52 87.97 12.02 12.47 87.96
Trigraph Press to Press 30.8 89.16 89.49 10.50 10.83 89.49
Trigraph Release to Release 40.9 88.47 88.92 11.07 11.52 88.92
Table 1 Accuracy, Threshold, and Equal Error Rate (eer) information for the different feature sets where the far and frr are equal to within 1%.
• True Negative Rate (tnr): the number of instances where an
invalid match is returned for an incorrect template match;
• False Negative Rate (fnr = 1 - tpr): the number of instances where
a invalid match is returned for a correct template match. Also known
as the False Rejection Rate (frr);
• Accuracy: the rate of correct decisions made. More specifically,
Accuracy = tpr+tnrtpr+tnr+fpr+fnr ; and• Equal Error Rate (eer): the point where far = frr.
6 Results and Discussion
Figure 4a presents the Receiver Operator Curve (ROC) showing the
different far and frr value with a changing threshold value. Figure 4b
shows the same information, only focusing in on the lower section
where far values are less than 0.4 and frr values are less than 0.2
to allow the reader to more easily see the difference in the feature
set. From analysing Figure 4a and 4b, it is immediately evident that
although there are differences between the results for each feature
set, the results overall are not too dissimilar between feature sets,
with variation often within 10%. The feature sets demonstrate that
the best results are with the trigraph press to press (trigraph p-p)
feature set, with the feature set containing all up and down timings
(f-t) following very closely behind. The feature set demonstrating the
worst results is press to press (p-p), followed by release to release (r-
r) and release to press (r-p). The next two best are trigraph release to
release (trigraph r-r) and press to release (p-r).
Table 1 presents the performance measures for each feature set
where the far and frr become equal to within 1% and represents the
Equal Error Rate (eer). The table also demonstrates the same order-
ings as illustrated in Figure 4a and Figure 4b. The best eer value is
observed to be 10% for both the feature set containing all timings
(f-t) and trigraph press to press (trigraph p-p). Table 1 also provides
the threshold value at which the eer was achieved. A general obser-
vation from these threshold values is that the higher the value, the
lower the eer value. These results are promising and demonstrate the
potential of a dynamic biometric system.
In the remainder of this section, the difference between pass-
word length, as well as the substitution of uppercase, special and
numeric characters is further investigated and discussed. Individ-
ual ROC illustrations are used (Appendix 9.3) for each of the 40
passwords (Appendix 9.1).
Table 2 provides both the number of times a feature set has been
identified as best for a participant’s test data set and the threshold
and accuracy values for the best overall feature set. The best overall
values are calculated by calculating accuracy values for testing all
participant test data sets. The table also shows the number of partici-
pants where each feature set produces the best performance for each
password. This has been established by identifying the feature set
resulting in the lowest eer, which is the point at which the far and
frr intersect. However, it should be noted that they are not exactly
equal (i.e., far = frr) because a stepsize of 0.1 was used to reduce the
computation overheads when performing the experiment. In Table 2,
only five feature sets are included, and this is because for all partici-
pant data sets, both p-r and r-r are never identified as being the best.
More specifically, they never produce an eer that is lower than any
other feature set when taking a participant’s test set and comparing
against all enrolled samples.
Before proceeding to analyse relationships between password fea-
tures and key timing gestures, an immediate observation evident in
Table 2 is that full timings set (f-t) and trigraph press to press (tri-
graph p-p) are identified as the best feature sets for all passwords.
However, this was to be expected as both these feature sets have the
best overall performance, as provided in Table 1. In total, f-t is iden-
tified to be the best feature set for 32 passwords and trigraph p-p for
8. Another general observation is that the best identified threshold
values for trigraph p-p (average 27) are lower than for f-t (average
49). The reason for this is because the trigraph p-p will contain fewer
timings for comparison and will result in a lower distance measure.
Another general observation identified during the experimentation is
that release to press (r-p) was the worst performing feature set and
was only selected as the best for 5 users for passwords of length 6
with no substitutions.
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Password f-t p-p r-p tri-p-p tri-r-r Best feature Set Threshold Accuracy tpr tnr fpr (far) fnr (frr)
action 15 9 1 16 0 tri-p-p 27.3 94.40 94.44 94.40 5.60 5.56
return 8 11 4 17 2 tri-p-p 12.8 93.05 93.06 93.05 6.95 6.94
bacteria 33 8 0 1 0 f-t 32.5 93.16 92.52 93.16 6.84 7.48
football 30 1 0 7 2 f-t 31.3 91.06 91.37 91.06 8.94 8.63
calculated 30 0 0 0 12 f-t 40.8 91.54 91.28 91.54 8.46 8.72
automotive 42 0 0 0 0 f-t 42.2 91.41 91.26 91.41 8.59 8.74
professional 42 0 0 0 0 f-t 44.6 91.01 91.18 91.01 8.99 8.82
technologies 22 0 0 18 1 f-t 46.1 90.85 90.71 90.85 9.15 9.29
Average values with no substitution: 92.06 91.98 92.06 7.94 8.02
Filter 13 0 0 18 11 tri-p-p 26.4 90.78 90.73 90.78 9.22 9.27
docTor 32 0 0 9 1 f-t 45.5 90.65 90.75 90.65 9.35 9.25
coMputer 38 0 0 4 0 f-t 46.1 90.35 90.46 90.35 9.65 9.54
clickiNg 29 0 0 11 2 f-t 26.7 90.20 90.23 90.20 9.80 9.77
conDitions 33 0 0 9 0 f-t 45.8 90.39 90.32 90.39 9.61 9.68
Conference 11 0 0 31 0 tri-p-p 26.8 90.08 90.15 90.08 9.92 9.85
disappointeD 7 0 0 35 0 tri-p-p 46.5 90.13 89.98 90.13 9.87 10.02
inflaMmation 26 0 0 16 0 f-t 27.4 90.14 90.23 90.14 9.86 9.77
Average values with uppercase substitution: 90.34 90.36 90.34 9.66 9.64
brok3n 30 0 0 10 2 f-t 27.7 90.02 89.88 90.02 9.98 10.12
cr1sis 10 0 0 32 0 tri-p-p 48.3 89.67 89.75 89.67 10.33 10.25
deliv3ry 38 0 0 4 0 f-t 27.7 89.91 89.98 89.91 10.09 10.02
ann0ying 25 0 0 16 0 f-t 48.3 89.68 89.68 89.69 10.31 10.32
underst0od 29 0 0 13 0 f-t 48.6 89.69 89.57 89.70 10.30 10.43
addressin9 15 0 0 27 0 tri-p-p 48.9 89.63 89.63 89.63 10.37 10.37
headqu4rters 30 0 0 11 0 f-t 49.4 89.53 89.51 89.53 10.47 10.49
pr3scription 24 0 0 18 0 f-t 49.2 89.53 89.61 89.53 10.47 10.39
Average values with numeric substitution: 89.71 89.70 89.71 10.29 10.30
fr!end 20 0 0 22 0 tri-p-p 49.7 89.49 89.51 89.49 10.51 10.49
gard£n 24 0 0 18 0 f-t 50.3 89.41 89.31 89.41 10.59 10.69
d|ameter 26 0 0 16 0 f-t 50.6 89.46 89.49 89.46 10.54 10.51
rec$ives 26 0 0 16 0 f-t 51.3 89.28 89.30 89.28 10.72 10.70
univers!ty 22 0 0 20 0 f-t 51.2 89.09 89.12 89.09 10.91 10.88
de\ivering 22 2 0 17 0 f-t 51.7 89.05 89.05 89.05 10.95 10.95
bre$thtaking 25 4 0 12 0 f-t 52 89.26 89.19 89.26 10.74 10.81
embarrassin? 38 0 0 3 0 f-t 52.7 89.25 89.22 89.25 10.75 10.78
Average values with symbol substitution: 89.29 89.27 89.29 10.71 10.73
F@st3r 41 0 0 0 0 f-t 53.6 89.18 89.17 89.18 10.82 10.83
pOl!c3 40 0 0 0 0 f-t 54.2 89.24 89.29 89.24 10.76 10.71
sc!enC3 42 0 0 0 0 f-t 53.8 89.40 89.35 89.40 10.60 10.65
he4Ven|y 42 0 0 0 0 f-t 53.7 89.39 89.41 89.39 10.61 10.59
|ndig3nOus 42 0 0 0 0 f-t 53.6 89.49 89.46 89.49 10.51 10.54
in5ul@tIon 42 0 0 0 0 f-t 53.6 89.54 89.50 89.54 10.46 10.50
aSynchr0#ous 42 0 0 0 0 f-t 53.4 89.51 89.54 89.51 10.49 10.46
cat@s7Rophic 42 0 0 0 0 f-t 53.1 89.51 89.51 89.51 10.49 10.49
Average values with uppercase, numeric, and symbol substitution: 89.41 89.40 89.41 10.59 10.60
Table 2 Comparison between individual passwords, showing the best identified feature set per password.
Next, the impact of the password characteristics and capabili-
ties of the proposed system are examined. Appendix 9.3 presents
20 individual ROC graphs presenting the results grouped by pass-
word characteristic which are in pairs. More specifically, the two
passwords generated with the different characteristics are grouped
together. For example, two passwords of six characters in length
with no substitutions (action and return) are presented together in
Figure 6a.
In this discussion we do not cross-reference with each ROC figure
to keep the text easy to read; however, the authors do recommend
the reader to review the ROC figures through the discussion as an
illustrative aid. The ROC figures are clearly labelled as to their asso-
ciated password. For example, Figure 6a, Figure 6b, Figure 6c, and
Figure 6d present the ROC for password lengths of 6, 8, 10, and
12, respectively. Furthermore, the ROC figures are grouped in 5
rows based on characteristics. The first (as four figures previously
cross-referenced) have no substitution, followed by a row including
uppercase substitution, and so forth. The reader can use these ROC
figures throughout this section to aid understanding. In each figure,
the ROC is provided for the seven different feature sets for the two
passwords of each length.
Table 2 demonstrates that for passwords with no substitutions, the
feature set identified as being best for the most participant test data
sets are full timings set (f-t) and trigraph press to press (trigraph p-
p). It is evident that trigraph p-p has been identified as being best
for only passwords with a length of 6 (action and return), and f-t
for passwords of lengths 8, 10, and 12. Interestingly, it is also evi-
dent that both action and return have the largest variety of features
identified as being best in comparison with all other passwords, irre-
spective of length and substitutions. In terms of accuracy, there is a
gradual decrease from 94% to 91%. This is also evident in the eer
where a decrease from 6% to 9%.
In terms of uppercase substitutions, each of the passwords has a
single uppercase character substitution made in different locations.
Interestingly, the results for all phrases generate similar accuracy and
eer rates of around 90% and 9-10% (only 0.7% variation), respec-
tively. Similar to instances with no uppercase substitution, f-t has
also been identified as the best feature set for 5 out of 8 of the
passwords, and trigraph p-p has been identified as best for 3 of the
passwords, which are of 6 and 10 characters in length. An interest-
ing observation is that those where trigraph p-p has been identified
1–12
Password Length Number
with f-t
Number
with tri-p-p
accuracy tpr tnr fpr (far) fnr (frr)
6 5 5 90.59 90.59 90.59 9.41 9.41
8 10 0 90.29 90.27 90.29 9.71 9.73
10 8 2 89.99 89.93 89.99 10.01 10.07
12 9 1 89.87 89.87 89.87 10.13 10.13
Table 3 Comparison between password length
as best, the position of the uppercase substitution is either the first or
last character.
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Fig. 4: Receiver Operator Curve for each feature set with varying
threshold values
Following the same process, numeric substitutions have been
made where all apart from two of the passwords lengths of 6 and
10 (cr1sis and adressin9) have the best performance with the tri-
graph p-p features set. In terms of accuracy and eer rate, that values
are quite consistent, showing a slight decrease (<1%) as password
length increases.
Similar to instances with either no or uppercase substitution, f-t
has also been identified as the best feature set for 6 out of 8 of the
passwords, and trigraph p-p has been identified as best for 2 of the
passwords. An interesting observation is that for only two partici-
pants are any other features sets identified as the best. This is the
trigraph r-r set for the password of brok3n.
In terms of special character substitutions, f-t has been identified
as best for the majority of password instances (7 out of 8) and tri-
graph p-p is identified as the best for one password of 6 characters
in length (fri!end). No other features have been identified as best for
any participant data sets, apart from p-p for two passwords, one of
length 8 and one of length 10. These passwords are de\ivering and
bre$thtaking. Accuracy and eer values remain consistent with a less
than 1% decrease for different lengths.
As demonstrated in Table 2, passwords containing all three types
of substitution are interesting because the f-t feature set has been
identified as best for all participant/password combinations. Further-
more, it is also interesting that this is the only substitution type
whereby the accuracy values remain within 0.5% variance, yet the
eer shows a slight improvement.
In terms of the average eer for passwords with different types
of substitution, the best are those with no substitution, followed by
uppercase, numeric, special character, and finally, a combination or
all three. However, it is worth noting that the difference is small,
decreasing from 91% accuracy and eer 8% for with no substitution
to 89% accuracy and eer 11% (rounded to 0 decimal places).
Table 3 provides results on an aggregated level for the different
password lengths. This includes a count of how many times tri-
graph p-p and f-t are identified as the best feature set for a password.
Furthermore, the table includes average accuracy values for all pass-
words with that length, irrespective of substitution type. A general
observation here are that f-t is the dominant feature set, except for
with passwords of 6 characters in length. Another observation is that
the eer is gradually worsening as the password length is increasing;
however, this is small and less than 1%. The results discussed so far
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focus on identifying the feature set with the lowest overall eer for all
participant/password combinations. In Figure 5 the number of times
each of the five feature sets are identified as the best for matching a
test password against the enrolled template. The table is interesting
as it demonstrates that there is good consistency with f-t being the
best feature set, followed by trigraph p-p second for all participants.
Any variation is often in the balance of f-t and trigraph p-p, but it is
clear that f-t is always the best.
6.1 Summary of Key Findings
In summary to the previous section where results are presented and
discussed, the below list provides a summary of the key findings
from this study:
• Improved accuracy is achieved where no substitutions are present
in the password (2% improvement). Furthermore, where no substi-
tutions are present, the accuracy is best for passwords of a shorter
length. More specifically, 94% for 6 characters in length, decreasing
to 90% for those 12 characters in length. Where substitutions have
been made, length has little significance with all substitution types
having around 1% variation in accuracy and eer. This demonstrates
the length is an important factor when utilising passwords with no
substitutions;
• Full-timing (f-t) feature set is identified as being the best for
the greatest number of participants, accounting for 69% of all par-
ticipant/password combinations. Trigraph press to press (trigraph
p-p) is the second best, accounting for 27%. The other three fea-
tures identified as best for some participant password combinations
account for 4% of the total. In addition, press to release and release
to press are never identified as the best feature set for any partic-
ipant/password combination. Considering that f-t has been identi-
fied as best in the majority of instances, there is no advantage to
converting the data into different feature sets;
• Passwords containing all three types of substitutions demonstrate
a small decrease in performance from any individual substitu-
tions instance. Furthermore, when compared to those with special
character substitutions, the eer has a slight improvement; and
• There is a small decrease in accuracy as length increases (1%)
across all feature sets, except where no substitutions are made. This
demonstrates that length has little significance in relation to accuracy
when a substitution of any type is introduced.
7 Availability
The data sets used in this research are made available at: https:
//selene.hud.ac.uk/scomsp2/keydynamics.zip.
8 Conclusion
This paper presents a systematic study of the key timings for 42
individuals for 40 different phases with varying length and with
different substitutions. The presented approach involves removing
outliers and creating a template for each user and phrase instance,
which resulted in the refinement of individual samples. One of the
user’s samples is reserved from being included in the template as it
is used for testing. The processed enrolled templates and test data
sets are then used to produce different feature sets (e.g., press to
press). The Manhattan distance measure is then used to quantify how
close a test sample matches any single template. A threshold mecha-
nism is then applied to determine whether a test sample’s Manhattan
distance measure is suitable to determine a match or a rejection.
Experimentation is performed to determine the threshold and fea-
ture set that yields the best performance. An Equal Error Rate of
between 10-11% and accuracy values of 89-90% were observed for
all feature sets, with the lowers being with the feature set contain-
ing all timings and trigraph press-to-press. Further empirical analysis
was then performed to gain an understanding of how phrase size and
substitutions impact on accuracy. Key observations have been deter-
mined and provide a useful insight for those designing keystroke
biometric systems, as well as doing further research into their capa-
bilities. Our study can help inform their experimental design. Of our
key findings, it is interesting to have identified that the capabilities
of a key dynamic system are at their best with no substitution and
the password is shorter in length (6). This means that implementing
a keystroke biometric system, alongside a strong password policy,
might have a negative impact on the biometric system.
Although this study provides useful insights into password pol-
icy and its impact on biometrics, there are limitations to the study.
The first limitation is in the number of participants and their similar
technical competence. The second being in the number of phrases
asked and the potential for more repetitive samples to be acquired
to further investigate repeatibility. Limitations are also present in the
the participant provides the timings sequentially on the same com-
puter hardware, and gaining timings using different hardware over a
prolonged period of time would help provide a more representative
dataset. However, notwithstanding these limitations, this study has
merits and the data is supportive of the findings. In future work, the
authors intend to address the aforementioned as well as consider the
use of different matching mechanisms.
9 Appendices
9.1 Password list
1. action
2. return
3. bacteria
4. football
5. calculated
6. automotive
7. professional
8. technologies
9. Filter
10. docTor
11. coMputer
12. clickiNg
13. conDitions
14. Conference
15. disappointeD
16. inflaMmation
17. brok3n
18. cr1sis
19. deliv3ry
20. ann0ying
21. underst0od
22. addressin9
23. headqu4rters
24. pr3scription
25. fr!end
26. gard£n
27. d|ameter
28. rec$ives
29. univers!ty
30. de\ivering
31. bre$thtaking
32. embarrassin?
33. F@st3r
34. pOl!c3
35. sc!enC3
36. he4Ven|y
37. |ndig3nOus
38. in5ul@tIon
39. aSynchr0#ous
40. cat@s7Rophic
9.2 Participant Responses
Table 4 provides the number of times a participant provided 0-6 rep-
etitions. Table 5 provides the number of times a participant provides
0-6 repetitions for each password.
9.3 ROC Plots
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